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I. INTRODUCTION 
In July 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a 
landmark decision in Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. 
Ecuador,1 an indigenous rights case that had been on the Inter-
 1. Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and 
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2002), 
available at http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_245_ing.pdf 
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American system’s docket for over eight years.2 The Inter-American 
Court held that the state of Ecuador had violated both international 
and domestic law by allowing an Argentine oil company to drill on 
indigenous land without first consulting the resident Kichwa 
community.3 Citing various sources of law, including the American 
Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”),4 the Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention (“ILO Convention 169”),5 and the Ecuadorian 
Constitution, the Court found Ecuador in breach of the Kichwa’s 
right to give or withhold their free, prior, and informed consent 
(“FPIC”) on all decisions potentially affecting their property or 
rights.  
Sarayaku represents a major victory for indigenous peoples 
throughout the Americas and perhaps the world. The decision sets a 
stricter standard than any preceding Inter-American decision or legal 
instrument on the rights to consultation and FPIC in the context of 
state-sponsored development. Brazil embodies a prime example of a 
state under the Court’s jurisdiction that likely is affected by the 
Sarayaku decision.6 In violation of its indigenous peoples’ rights, 
Brazil approved the development of Belo Monte, a major 
hydroelectric complex whose construction currently is underway.7  
[hereinafter Sarayaku]. 
 2. See id. ¶ 1 (noting that the Association of the Kichwa People of Sarayaku 
and others filed the petition before the Commission on Dec. 19, 2003). 
 3. See id. ¶ 341, § 1–4 (finding that Ecuador’s acts and omissions surrounding 
the Sarayaku Kichwa amounted to a violation of the indigenous people’s rights to 
consultation, communal property, and cultural identity). 
 4. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, 
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]. 
 5. International Labour Organisation, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention (No. 169) art. 16, June 27, 1989, 72 ILO Official Bull. 55 [hereinafter 
ILO Convention 169]. 
 6. Although the Inter-American system does not possess a formal rule of stare 
decisis, the Commission and the Court regularly refer to past holdings to inform 
their applications of the ACHR and determine whether an OAS state has violated 
substantive provisions. See, e.g., Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Cost, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 174, ¶ 
63 (Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Saramaka] (relying on the Court’s evidentiary 
analyses in Awas Tingni and five other cases to assess the documentary evidence in 
the case at hand and thereby assess Suriname’s liability). 
 7. Elzio Barreto & Carolina Marcondes, Brazil OKs Building of $17 bln 
Amazon Power Dam, REUTERS, Jan. 26, 2011, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/26/brazil-energy-amazon-
idAFN2613167320110126. 
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This comment argues that the new FPIC standard set by Sarayaku 
has the potential to delegitimize Belo Monte’s development, which 
Brazil authorized without first properly consulting the indigenous 
groups whose lands and livelihoods it will adversely affect. Part II 
provides a history of the dam and describes its projected impacts on 
local indigenous peoples. It then presents the legal underpinnings of 
Brazil’s consultation and FPIC obligations, as provided by the 
ACHR, Brazilian law, and ILO Convention 169. Part II concludes by 
discussing how Sarayaku further expands the consultation and FPIC 
protections established by prior Inter-American case law.  
Part III draws parallels between Sarayaku and the Belo Monte 
dispute to demonstrate the applicability of the Sarayaku standard to 
the latter. To achieve this, Part III analyzes Brazil’s acts and 
omissions surrounding Belo Monte to illustrate that the state is in 
breach of the same legal instruments and FPIC standards that the 
Court found Ecuador had violated in Sarayaku.  
Part IV offers recommendations on how Brazil should proceed 
with Belo Monte’s development in light of Sarayaku. Part IV 
concludes by attempting to fill the gap in the existing international 
indigenous rights law by suggesting that ILO Convention 169 revise 
its text to reflect the Sarayaku standard. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE BELO MONTE HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 
1. The Development of the Controversial Dam 
For over thirty years, the Xingu Basin of the Brazilian Amazon 
has been the site of an ongoing development dispute that has drawn 
intense reactions from the Brazilian public and the international 
community alike. Under the original 1970s plan, what was then 
known as the Altamira Complex would have consisted of six 
separate dams and five generating plants.8 The highly controversial 
 8. See Jacquelyn Amour Jampolsky, Comment, Activism Is the New Black! 
Demonstrating the Benefits of International Celebrity Activism Through James 
Cameron's Campaign Against the Belo Monte Dam, 23 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & 
POL'Y 227, 243 (2012) (stating that the complex would have consisted of two dams 
whose sustained operation would have required the building of four additional 
dams). 
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proposal required flooding of over 20,000 square kilometers of land, 
including the entire Paquigamba indigenous reserve.9 In response to 
severe criticism from the international community and violent dissent 
from indigenous groups—which led even the World Bank, the 
project’s principal funder, to withdraw its backing—the government 
modified its proposal.10 By 1998, the renamed “Belo Monte” 
complex had undergone a drastic makeover. The new design called 
for a single dam capable of producing eleven gigawatts of electricity 
and for the inundation of 500 square kilometers of land,11 a third of 
the area that would have been flooded under the original scheme.12 
While smaller than the Altamira Complex, Belo Monte will still be 
the world’s third largest dam and is expected to cost R$20 billion to 
develop.13  
Despite its reduced scale, Belo Monte’s development still 
threatens to wreak havoc on the ecological and social landscape of 
the Xingu Basin.14 Nevertheless, Brazil continues to defend the 
project, claiming that it will create thousands of new jobs and is 
critical to meeting the country’s growing energy needs.15 Sitting 
 9. See id. (observing that the complex’s construction and operation would 
have either displaced or directly affected twelve indigenous groups). But see Cases 
Examined by the Special Rapporteur (June 2009 – July 2010), U.N. Doc, 
A/HRC/15/37/Add.1, 32 (Sept. 15, 2010) (by James Anaya) [hereinafter Anaya 
2010 Report] (reporting that the Brazilian state claimed only 1500 square 
kilometers of land would have been flooded under the original scheme). 
 10. See Anthony L. Hall & Sue Branford, Development, Dams and Dilma: The 
Saga of Belo Monte, 38 CRIT. SOCIOL. 851, 852 (2012) (describing the “First 
Encounter of the Indigenous Nations of the Xingu” of 1989, a massive 
confrontation between indigenous protestors and developers that drew international 
attention to the dam and its destructive potential); Jampolsky, supra note 8, at 243 
(describing the collaborative social movement that led to the World Bank’s 
withdrawal from the project). 
 11. See Tom Phillips, Brazil to Build Controversial Belo Monte Hydroelectric 
Dam in Amazon Rainforest, GUARDIAN, Feb. 2, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/02/brazil-amazon-rainforest-
hydroelectric-dam (noting that energy production is expected to start in 2015). 
 12. Anaya 2010 Report, supra note 9, at 32. 
 13. See Phillips, supra note 11 (reporting the Brazilian environmental 
ministry’s claims that the consortium awarded the Belo Monte project will have to 
spend an additional $800 million to offset the project’s environmental damage). 
 14. See infra Part II.A.2 (identifying the projected social and ecological 
impacts of Belo Monte on the Xingu Basin). 
 15. See Ministry of Mines and Energy, BELO MONTE HYDROELECTRIC DAM 
PROJECT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 6, 10 (2011), available at 
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President Rousseff, who inherited Belo Monte from the Lula 
administration, has championed the dam as the cornerstone of her 
plans to expand Brazil’s energy infrastructure and harvest the 
Amazon’s hydropower potential.16 The state has also promoted Belo 
Monte as a model of “green” energy that will allegedly help Brazil 
comply with its international environmental obligations.17  
The state’s firm backing of Belo Monte perhaps explains why the 
project has flourished despite glaring omissions and illegalities 
throughout its authorization and implementation processes. In fact, 
Brazil permitted its National Congress to hold a legislative vote to 
approve the dam without first consulting the numerous indigenous 
groups affected by its development.18 According to a court decision 
that was later reversed, failure to consult the indigenous groups 
directly violated domestic law and, as such, the decree authorizing 
the dam is invalid and unenforceable.19  
Furthermore, the government’s issuance of a “partial installation 
http://www.brasil.gov.br/para/press/files/faq-belo-monte-1 [hereinafter FAQS] 
(claiming that Belo Monte will provide abundant low-cost energy and directly 
create 19,000 jobs during the peak of its construction). 
 16. See Brazil Court Reverses Amazon Monte Belo Dam Suspension, BBC 
NEWS, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12643261 
[hereinafter Court Reverses] (“The government says the dam is crucial for 
development and will create jobs, as well as provide electricity to 23 million 
homes.”). 
 17. See Press Release, Int’l Rivers, Amazonian Communities Occupy the Belo 
Monte Dam Site (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/ 
resources/amazonian-communities-occupy-the-belo-monte-dam-site-7514 
(discussing the government’s claims that the dam is a “source of ‘clean energy’ for 
a ‘Green Economy,’” but also noting that the dam will produce “an enormous 
amount of methane, a greenhouse gas 25–50 times more potent than carbon 
dioxide”). 
 18. See Mariano Castillo, Judge Halts Construction on Brazil’s Belo Monte 
Dam, CNN, Aug. 15, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/15/world/americas/ 
brazil-belo-monte-dam/index.html (reporting a federal court’s decision to suspend 
construction on the dam until affected indigenous communities “get a say on the 
matter”). 
 19. See Brazilian Court Halts Belo Monte Hydroelectric Dam Project, BBC 
NEWS, Aug. 14, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19263675 
[hereinafter Court Halts Belo Monte Project] (quoting Judge Souza Prudente as 
holding that legislators can only give the “go-ahead” to projects affecting 
indigenous rights if the communities concerned have provided their consent, and 
therefore, without such consent, the legislation to approve the dam was “flawed”). 
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license” was not authorized under Brazilian law.20 The Brazilian 
Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources 
(“IBAMA”), the Ministry of the Environment’s enforcement agency, 
granted Norte Energia the partial license in 2011 even though the 
consortium had not met twenty-nine environmental and social 
conditions.21 These conditions, which the law requires developers to 
meet before construction, included regulations concerning health, 
education, sanitation infrastructure, and the protection of indigenous 
lands.22  
The official environmental impact assessment (“EIA”) and the 
processes surrounding the distribution of its findings also have been 
wrought with error and ineffectiveness. Eletrobras, a state-owned 
utilities company belonging to the Norte Energia consortium, carried 
out the study without involving the affected indigenous 
communities.23 Furthermore, despite allegations that the study 
grossly understated the dam’s socio-environmental impacts, IBAMA 
succumbed to political pressure and approved the faulty EIA in 
February 2010.24 The state then failed to ensure that the public could 
adequately access the study to become properly informed about the 
dam and its projected impacts; in fact, the highly technical 20,000-
page document became publicly available only two days before the 
Brazil Institute of the Environment (“BIE”) held meetings with 
affected communities.25 BIE also hosted the meetings in urban areas 
 20. Press Release, Amazon Watch, Int’l Rivers, Regional Judge Overturns Ban 
on Construction of Controversial Belo Monte Dam in the Brazilian Amazon (Mar. 
5, 2011), available at http://amazonwatch.org/news/2011/0305-regional-judge-
overturns-ban-on-construction-of-controversial-belo-monte-dam [hereinafter 
Construction Ban Overturned]. 
 21. See Brazil Judge Blocks Amazon Belo Monte Dam, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25, 
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12586170 (describing 
Judge Desterro’s decision to suspend construction until Brazil ensured all the 
environmental and social conditions were met). 
 22. See Construction Ban Overturned, supra note 20 (reporting that a federal 
court subsequently overturned Desterro’s holding). 
 23. See Press Release, Int’l Rivers, Belo Monte Dam Suspended by Brazilian 
Appeals Court (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/ 
resources/belo-monte-dam-suspended-by-brazilian-appeals-court-7631 (explaining 
that this omission led the Regional Federal Tribunal to block the dam’s 
construction, a decision that was subsequently overturned). 
 24. See id. (stating that IBAMA had approved the EIA in spite of objections 
from its own technical staff). 
 25. See Anaya 2010 Report, supra note 9, at 32 (explaining that it was thus 
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difficult to access from the remote rural sites where most of the 
affected indigenous groups reside.26 
The public meetings held by Brazil and Norte Energia thus far 
have been highly contentious and ineffective. As such, they hardly 
qualify as the “consultations” Brazil is legally bound to hold.27 
Participants have described the meetings as “unequal” and “totally 
asymmetric,” noting Norte Energia’s persistent refusal to address 
indigenous demands.28 Rather than fostering a climate conducive to 
collaboration, the company has fueled conflicts between different 
indigenous groups and within communities.29  
Moreover, the meetings’ participants have accused the company of 
attempting to “buy [them] off cheaply,” by offering televisions, 
boats, and other perks while refusing to address the various legally-
required social and environmental conditions the company has yet to 
fulfill.30 Norte Energia evidently has even taken advantage of 
language barriers between its representatives and participating 
indigenous groups by allowing interpreters to misrepresent the 
“impossible for [affected indigenous groups] to be fully acquainted with the very 
complex and highly technical project”). 
 26. See id. (noting that the cost and difficulty of travel prevented some 
indigenous groups from attending the meetings). 
 27. See infra Part II.B (describing the legal underpinnings of the rights to 
consultation and to FPIC). 
 28. See Press Release, Amazon Watch, After 21 Days, Indigenous Occupation 
of Belo Monte Dam Ends in Discord (July 12, 2012), available at 
http://amazonwatch.org/news/2012/0712-after-21-days-indigenous-occupation-of-
belo-monte-dam-ends-in-discord [hereinafter After 21 Days] (quoting Biviany 
Rojas, an attorney with the Brazilian organization Instituto Socioambiental, and 
describing the meetings between the multibillion-dollar corporation and the 
divided tribes of indigenous peoples). 
 29. See Belo Monte Agrava Desarticulação Indígena [Belo Monte Aggravates 
Indigenous Disarticulation], INSTITUTO HUMANITAS UNISINOS (June 29, 2012), 
http://www.ihu.unisinos.br/entrevistas/510983-barragem-agrava-desarticulacao-
indigena-entrevista-especial-com-rodolfo-salm [hereinafter Belo Monte Agrava] 
(reporting that Norte Energia has taken advantage of ancient tensions between the 
Xikrin and the Kayapó to undermine collaboration between the groups in their 
joint campaign against the dam). 
 30. See After 21 Days, supra note 28 (stating that while Norte Energia 
repeatedly offered “trinkets” to the various participants, it refused to set a timetable 
for meeting the socio-environmental conditions as required by law or address the 
peoples’ key concerns regarding navigability around the dam, loss of livelihoods, 
land demarcation, and education and health programs, among others). 
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statements of attendees with distorted translations.31 During talks in 
July 2012, the Arara and Juruna communities in attendance became 
so frustrated with the consortium’s refusal to cooperate that they 
non-violently detained three of its employees on tribal lands in 
protest.32 Despite the communities’ repeated efforts to engage 
developers in good faith dialogues, however, both Brazil and Norte 
Energia continue to disregard indigenous interests.  
At present, construction of Belo Monte is already more than ten 
percent complete. Though the dam has survived numerous judicial 
efforts to shut it down, legal battles and protests rage on, 
spearheaded by everyone from local indigenous leaders to 
international celebrities.33 As this comment will assess, the 
precedential value of Sarayaku may offer the Xingu Basin’s 
indigenous peoples an effective path to recourse. 
2. Projected Impacts of the Belo Monte Dam  
Belo Monte’s operation will divert more than eighty percent of the 
Xingu River’s flow.34 The most apparent outcome of this will be the 
inundation of over 500 square kilometers of land, an area three times 
the size of Washington, D.C.35 The Brazilian government estimates 
that large-scale flooding will displace around 20,000 people from the 
Xingu Basin, while NGOs place the number closer to 40,000–
 31. See id. (explaining that the Xikrin only agreed to stop a twenty-one-day 
occupation of the dam site after a series of “confusing and poorly translated” 
sessions with Norte Energia representatives). 
 32. Press Release, Amazon Watch, Amidst Broken Promises, Indigenous 
Authorities Detain Belo Monte Dam Engineers (July 25, 2011), available at 
http://amazonwatch.org/news/2012/0725-amidst-broken-promises-indigenous-
authorities-detain-belo-monte-dam-engineers [hereinafter Broken Promises] 
(stating that the tribal leaders vowed to keep the engineers “under detention until 
Norte Energia and government agencies have fully carried out promises to mitigate 
and compensate adverse impacts of Belo Monte”). 
 33. See, e.g., Jampolsky, supra note 8, at 229–30 (describing the anti-Belo 
Monte campaign launched by award-winning film director James Cameron). 
 34. See Bianca Jagger, The Belo Monte Dam: An Environmental Crime, 
HUFFINGTON POST, June 21, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bianca-
jagger/the-belo-monte-dam-an-env_b_1614057.html (reporting that Brazil will 
need to build as many as five additional dams upriver, directly flooding the 
territories). 
 35. See Barreto & Marcondes, supra note 7 (stating that dam operations will 
also partially desiccate a hundred-kilometer stretch of the Xingu River). 
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50,000.36 Though the state insists that the project will not flood 
indigenous land,37 studies reveal that local populations nonetheless 
face numerous calamities.38  
Foremost, sections of the Xingu Basin that will not be underwater 
will be left in perpetual drought. Research reveals that Belo Monte’s 
development will dry out the Big Bend, a sixty-two mile stretch of 
river that serves both as an ecological hotspot and a sacred “cradle of 
civilization” for the basin’s indigenous groups.39 Experts claim the 
destruction of the Xingu will constitute a huge spiritual loss for local 
peoples, for the basin’s very name means “house of god” in native 
languages.40  
In addition to the cultural implications, drought conditions will 
greatly diminish floral and faunal populations, jeopardize water 
access, and impede fluvial navigation.41 Inhabitants of affected areas 
will become geographically isolated and unable to travel to the 
commercial centers, schools, and social service providers located in 
urban areas.42 The loss of access to local markets and medical 
 36. Compare Ministério de Minas e Energia et al., RELATÓRIO DE IMPACTO 
AMBIENTAL: APROVEITAMENTO HIDRELÉTRICO BELO MONTE 85, 93 (2009) 
[hereinafter RIMA] (projecting that the dam will displace approximately 16,000 
people from the Altamira area and another 2,000 from rural locations), with Court 
Reverses, supra note 16 (claiming that as many as 50,000 people will become 
homeless). 
 37. See Sheena Rossiter, Brazil's New Dam Unleashes Flood of Anger and 
Hope: World View, BLOOMBERG, June 17, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-06-17/brazil-s-new-dam-unleashes-flood-of-anger-and-hope-world-
view.html (quoting Energy and Mining Minister Edison Lobao as declaring that 
“[n]o indigenous person will have to leave where they are today”). 
 38. See, e.g., Belo Monte Facts: 10 Myths the Brazilian Government Wants 
You to Believe About Belo Monte, AMAZON WATCH, http://amazonwatch.org/work/ 
belo-monte-facts (last visited July 26, 2013) [hereinafter 10 Myths] (identifying 
decreased water quality, faunal habitat destruction, loss of biodiversity, and 
increased incidence of water-borne diseases as some of the dam’s projected 
impacts). 
 39. See Sara Diamond & Christian Poirier, Brazil's Native Peoples and the 
Belo Monte Dam: A Case Study, 43 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 25, 26–27 
(2010) (explaining that it will become impossible for local peoples to continue to 
rely on the river as a channel for trade and a source of some fish species). 
 40. Id. at 27 (stating that the Xingu’s destruction will be “nothing less than a 
cosmological catastrophe” for local peoples). 
 41. See 10 Myths, supra note 38. 
 42. See Diamond & Poirier, supra note 39, at 29 (claiming that dam developers 
have also threatened to actively cut off the indigenous communities’ access to 
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facilities will become particularly problematic given the dam’s 
projected effects on public health and rural food security.43  
The Belo Monte Dam also threatens to substantially deplete the 
Xingu Basin’s fish stock, impeding the communities’ enjoyment of 
the river’s resources and ability to subsist.44 One study estimates that 
reduced water flow will result in the death of millions of fish along 
the Big Bend, an outcome that apparently no measure will be able to 
offset or mitigate.45  
Studies reveal that communities are already witnessing the adverse 
effects of dam activities on local wildlife. In September 2012, 
fishermen from the basin reported that the construction of a 
cofferdam had reduced fisheries production by fifty percent.46 Such 
an outcome will have strong implications for upstream communities 
like the Kayapó, whose dietary staples include migratory species.47 
Also at risk are ornamental fish, which groups like the Juruna collect 
certain social services if they refuse to consent to the dam’s development). 
 43. See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Indigenous Communities of the Xingu 
River Basin, Pará, Brazil, PM 382/10, Apr. 1, 2011 (precautionary measures), ¶ 32 
(noting the massive influx of migrants and dam activities will lead to the spread of 
communicable and water-borne diseases); see also RIMA, supra note 36, at 85 
(affirming that the population boom will leave indigenous groups more exposed to 
alcoholism, drugs, and prostitution). 
 44. MINISTERIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL, TRF-1, No. 0028944-98.2011.4.01.3900, 
17.08.2011, 11 (Brazil), available at http://www.prpa.mpf.gov.br/news/2011/ 
BeloMonte_Remocao.pdf/view [hereinafter Juruna-Arara Action] (observing that 
Belo Monte’s expected impacts on the Big Bend’s ecosystem is particularly 
worrisome because certain species of fish, like Hypancistrus zebra, exist nowhere 
else in the world). 
 45. Compare id. at 11 (pointing out that the official EIA for Belo Monte fails to 
mention this particular “irreversible” impact), with RIMA, supra note 36, at 114–
16 (affirming only that certain species of fish will “suffer,” but failing to provide 
specific estimates of the expected damage). The EIA even downplays the threat by 
claiming that the species expected to flourish after the reservoir’s construction will 
be of higher subsistence and economic value than those that will be wiped out. Id. 
 46. See Press Release, Int’l Rivers, Fishermen Paralyze Construction of the 
Belo Monte Dam (Sept. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/fishermen-paralyze-construction-of-
the-belo-monte-dam-7680 (describing how fifty fishermen set up a protest camp on 
the Xingu to prevent Belo Monte workers from accessing a cofferdam’s 
construction site in response to the dam’s impact on ecologically sensitive fish 
species). 
 47. See Diamond & Poirier, supra note 39, at 26–27 (attributing the expected 
losses of aquatic fauna in part to the significant decline in the Big Bend’s water 
table that is projected to occur). 
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and sell to local markets and intermediaries as a primary means of 
generating income.48 Thus, both Belo Monte’s direct and indirect 
impacts threaten local communities’ enjoyment and use of their lands 
and resources.  
B. THE RIGHT TO FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT AND ITS 
LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS 
As this comment will discuss, Brazil’s endorsement of Belo Monte 
constitutes a violation of the state’s consultation and FPIC duties 
under both domestic and international law. A growing number of 
international guidelines and legal instruments, both binding and non-
binding, recognize the right of indigenous people to be consulted on 
policies and decisions affecting their rights and livelihoods.49 The 
right of indigenous peoples to FPIC, where afforded, is intrinsically 
tied to this right to consultation. According to advanced indigenous 
rights regimes, consultations should aim to secure affected peoples’ 
prior and informed consent,50 which these peoples in turn may freely 
choose to give or withhold.51  
 48. See RIMA, supra note 36, at 114; see also Press Release, Int’l Rivers, 
Independent Review Highlights the True Costs of Belo Monte Dam (Oct. 12, 
2009), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/independent-
review-highlights-the-true-costs-of-belo-monte-dam-3783 (identifying the 
commercially valuable zebra pleco and the sheep pacu fish as facing possible 
extinction as a result of the dam). 
 49. See, e.g., U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, 61st Sess. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, art. 19 (Oct. 2, 2007) 
[hereinafter UNDRIP] (“States shall consult with indigenous peoples in good faith 
and through their own representative institutions . . . before adopting any 
administrative or legislative measures that may affect them.”); ILO Convention 
169, supra note 5, art. 6 (requiring states to carry out consultations “with the 
objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures”); World 
Bank, Operational Policy (OP) 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, para. 1 (adopted in 
May 2005, effective July 2005) (stating that the “Bank provides project financing 
only where free, prior, and informed consultation results in broad community 
support to the project by the affected Indigenous Peoples”). 
 50. See, e.g., ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 6. 
 51. See generally Andrea Carmen, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent: A Framework for Harmonious Relations and New Processes for Redress, 
in REALIZING THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: 
TRIUMPH, HOPE, AND ACTION 120, 120 (Jackie Hartley ed., 2010) (claiming the 
right of indigenous peoples to FPIC is crucial to their “ability to exert sovereignty 
over their lands,” redress abuses of their rights, and “establish criteria for 
negotiations with states on matters affecting them”). 
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1. The American Convention on Human Rights: Article 21 and Its 
Interpretive History  
The right to consultation evolved from international law’s 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination,52 
specifically with regard to their cultural use of ancestral lands.53 The 
American Convention on Human Rights, which both Brazil and 
Ecuador have ratified, requires states to respect citizens’ right to 
property.54 While the ACHR does not expressly entitle indigenous 
peoples to consultations, Article 21’s recognition that everyone is 
afforded “the use and enjoyment of his property” has become a key 
basis for the evolving right.55 Four cases, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua,56 Mary and Carrie Dann v. United 
States,57 Maya Indigenous Communities of Toledo District v. 
Belize,58 and Saramaka People v. Suriname,59 have been particularly 
 52. See UNDRIP, supra note 49, art. 3 (defining the right to self-determination 
as providing peoples the liberty to “freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development”). 
 53. See James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to 
Decisions About Natural Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of 
What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Land and Resources, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 7, 8–9 (2005) (noting that the importance of land and resources to the 
survival of indigenous cultures is a “widely accepted tenet” of contemporary 
indigenous rights advocacy); see also Jeremy Firestone et. al., Cultural Diversity, 
Human Rights, and the Emergence of Indigenous Peoples in International and 
Comparative Environmental Law, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 219, 262 (2005) 
(identifying an emerging “paradigmatic shift” with regard to the international 
commununity’s increasing acknowledgment and some states’ willingness to allow 
indigenous peoples’ active involvement in the management of natural resources 
and the protection of their intellectual property rights). 
 54. See ACHR, supra note 4, art. 21 (declaring that no one shall be deprived of 
his property without “just compensation, which would include only the reasons of 
public utility or societal interest”). 
 55. See id.; Alex Page, Indigenous Peoples’ Free Prior and Informed Consent 
in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 16, 
16-17 (2004) (asserting that collective ownership and self-governance strongly 
affect how indigenous peoples make decisions related to their property). 
 56. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79 (2001), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_79_ing.pdf [hereinafter Awas 
Tingni]. 
 57. Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/1I. 117, 
doc.1 rev. 1 (2003), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA. 
11140.htm. 
 58. Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, 
doc. 5 rev. 1 (2004), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize. 
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instrumental to expanding the scope of the right to property as 
applied to indigenous peoples, thereby contributing to the 
development of the right to FPIC.  
Decided in 2001, Awas Tingni was the first internationally binding 
ruling to extend the right to property to indigenous land and 
resources.60 The Inter-American Court found Nicaragua had violated 
Article 21 of the ACHR by granting logging concessions on lands 
traditionally used and occupied by the Awas Tingni without first 
obtaining the community’s consent.61 The decision was a watershed 
because it established the collective right of indigenous peoples to 
traditional lands even in the absence of official state-issued titles.62  
Some indigenous rights advocates have lamented the fact that 
Awas Tingni did not clarify the extent of indigenous peoples’ right to 
property and thereby leaves significant gaps in protection.63 Still, 
others applaud the decision for holding that a state has an affirmative 
duty to protect indigenous peoples from third-party infringements on 
their land rights even when it is not directly responsible for the 
interference.64  
12053eng.htm. 
 59. Saramaka, supra note 6. 
 60. See generally Awas Tingni, supra note 56 (holding that the Constitution of 
Nicaragua and Article 21 of the ACHR protects the property rights of indigenous 
community members “within the framework of communal property”). 
 61. See id. ¶¶ 142–55 (noting that while Nicaragua had already formally 
recognized indigenous peoples’ property rights, it had yet to “materialize that 
recognition” through a specific procedure to grant title deeds). 
 62. See Jennifer A. Amiott, Environment, Equality, and Indigenous Peoples’ 
Land Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Mayagna (Sumo) 
Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 32 ENVTL. L. 873, 889 
(2002) (declaring that the decision also establishes that states can no longer turn to 
their domestic laws to validate violations of indigenous peoples’ rights). 
 63. David C. Baluarte, Comment, Balancing Indigenous Rights and a State’s 
Right to Develop in Latin America: The Inter-American Rights Regime and ILO 
Convention 169, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 9, 9 (2004) (pointing out that “at 
no point did the Court rule on the legitimacy of [the] administrative process” 
authorizing the concession at dispute, and thus “the Court's express denial of any 
reparations beyond the order to demarcate the [Awas Tingni’s] lands leaves the 
question of where the line is drawn between the indigenous right to land and the 
State's right to develop”). 
 64. Awas Tingni, supra note 56, ¶ 164 (ordering Nicaragua to abstain from and 
prevent any actions that might affect the “existence, value, use or enjoyment of the 
[Awas Tingni’s] property,” including those carried out by third parties). 
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Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States,65 which arose from a land 
dispute between the U.S. government and members of the Western 
Shoshone Nation, expanded Awas Tingni’s precedent.66 Dann 
provided that any state decisions affecting indigenous land rights 
must be based on the “fully informed and mutual consent on the part 
of the indigenous community as a whole.”67 Notably, Dann ruled that 
international law requires states to adopt “special measures” to 
ensure that nothing deprives indigenous peoples of their collective 
right to property without their consent.68  
Maya Indigenous Communities expanded on Dann, holding that 
the duty to consult with the purpose of securing consent is a 
“fundamental” component of states’ duty to respect indigenous land 
rights.69 Belize’s obligation to recognize Maya land rights through 
the delimitation, demarcation, and titling of traditional territory thus 
required the state to consult the communities and develop a system 
consistent with their customary land use practices.70 However, while 
reaffirming the notion of informed consent, Maya Indigenous 
Communities declined to find “an independent basis for FPIC in 
international law protecting rights to consultation and self-
determination.”71 As such, the decision left the rights of indigenous 
peoples to consultation intrinsically tied to their property rights.72  
 65. Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/1I. 
117, doc.1 rev. 1 (2003). 
 66. See generally id. (adjudicating the Danns’ allegations that the US violated 
their rights under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man by 
imposing use restrictions on Western Shoshone traditional lands). 
 67. Id. ¶ 165 (forbidding the exclusion of individual members of an indigenous 
community from decision-making processes affecting their collective property 
interests). 
 68. See id. ¶ 131 (requiring states to consult indigenous peoples on decisions 
affecting their lands “under conditions of equality,” and providing “fair 
compensation” when appropriate). 
 69. See generally Press Release, Government Reviews Report of the Inter-
American 
Commission on Human Rights, (Jan. 19, 2004); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Preliminary 
Report No. 96/03, Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District, ¶ 154 
(Oct. 24, 2003) (observing that traditional lands play a central role in the “physical, 
cultural, and spiritual vitality” of indigenous peoples). 
 70. See id. ¶ 129 (explaining that Belize must fulfill this obligation “in full 
collaboration” with the Maya people). 
 71. Page, supra note 55, at 19. 
 72. See id. at 16, 19 (arguing that neither indigenous land rights nor FPIC can 
be properly understood without acknowledging the interrelationship between 
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The Inter-American Court addressed this potential gap in 
protection in its ruling for Saramaka v. Belize.73 Saramaka noted that 
while Article 21 allows state laws to subordinate property rights to 
societal interests, such restrictions cannot deny an indigenous or 
tribal group’s survival as a people.74 The Court set specific 
safeguards to ensure indigenous peoples’ effective participation in 
decision-making processes affecting their property. For instance, the 
Court defined states’ consultation duty to include the task of 
disseminating information on the projected social and environmental 
impacts of a proposed measure to all communities that may be 
affected.75 Also, for the first time, the Court specified that 
consultations must be carried out “in good faith, be culturally 
appropriate, and have the intent of reaching an agreement.”76 
Importantly, Saramaka also held that when large-scale development 
may jeopardize the survival of a people, the state must not only 
consult the people but also actually “obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent.”77  
The four cases discussed not only contributed to the interpretative 
history of Article 21’s right to property, but also laid the foundation 
for the rights of indigenous peoples to consultation and to FPIC. 
Sarayaku further extended the scope of protection for indigenous 
peoples by presenting a stricter, more detailed FPIC standard for 
Organization of American States (“OAS”) states to follow.  
indigenous self-determination and communal property ownership). 
 73. See generally Saramaka, supra note 6 (finding that Suriname had violated 
the tribal Saramaka people’s rights to property and judicial protection by granting 
logging and mining concessions in their land without their consent). 
 74. See id. ¶¶ 127–28 (affirming that restrictions are only acceptable under the 
“interest of society” exception if they are: “a) previously established by law; b) 
necessary; c) proportional; and d) with the aim of achieving a legitimate objective 
in a democratic society”). 
 75. See id. ¶ 133 (requiring a state to consult communities not only when it 
needs to obtain their approval, but also during the early stages of the project). The 
Court particularly observes the importance of early notice, which allows 
communities to carry out internal discussions and provide feedback in a timely 
manner. Id. 
 76. Id. (calling on states to maintain “constant” communication by means that 
take into account the “Saramaka people’s traditional methods of decision-
making”). 
 77. See id. ¶ 134 (noting the need to further analyze the difference between 
“consultation” and “consent” in this context). 
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2. Sarayaku v. Ecuador: Setting a Higher Standard for the Right to 
FPIC 
Sarayaku v. Ecuador first entered the Inter-American system’s 
docket in 2003, when the plaintiff Kichwa community of Sarayaku 
filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission for Human 
Rights (“IACHR”).78 According to the petition, Ecuador acted 
unlawfully by allowing a private company to develop on Kichwa 
lands without first consulting the resident community and obtaining 
its free and informed consent.79 Finding a legal and substantive basis 
for the plaintiff’s complaint, the IACHR referred the case to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights for adjudication.80 In July 
2012, eight years after the case first entered the Inter-American 
system, the Court issued a landmark decision, finding Ecuador in 
breach of both domestic and international human rights obligations.81  
The Court concluded that Ecuador had violated the Kichwa’s 
FPIC rights by examining several sources of law: the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the Ecuadorian Constitution, and ILO 
Convention 169. Foremost, the Court held that Ecuador had breached 
Article 21 of the ACHR by failing to consult the Kichwa on the 
execution of a project directly affecting their territory.82 The Court 
noted that activities of the CGC, an Argentinian-based oil company, 
infringed on the Kichwa’s right to use and enjoy their traditionally 
occupied property in several ways. Not only did the company 
physically occupy the territory without first obtaining the 
community’s permission,83 but the oil exploration also physically 
 78. See Kichwa Peoples of the Sarayaku Community v. Ecuador, Case 12.465, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 64/04 (2004) (admissibility findings). 
 79. See id. ¶ 2 (alleging violations of specific articles of the ACHR and 
domestic law). 
 80. See generally Kichwa People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Case 12.465, 
Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Apr. 26, 2010), 
available at http://www.cidh.org/demandas/12.465%20Sarayaku%20Ecuador% 
2026abr2010%20ENG.pdf. 
 81. See generally Sarayaku, supra note 1. 
 82. See id. ¶ 232 (holding that Ecuador was obligated under both international 
and domestic law to take all measures necessary to ensure the Sarayaku people’s 
participation in decision-making processes concerning measures that could affect 
their property rights and way of life). 
 83. See id. ¶ 124 (explaining that Ecuador acknowledged that it had granted 
CGC a contract for oil exploration on Sarayaku territory without first securing the 
community’s consent). 
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altered the land. For example, CGC planted dangerous explosives in 
the ground, clear-cut nearly 200 kilometers of primary forest, and 
destroyed sites of cultural and spiritual value to the Kichwa.84 
In addition to the ACHR, the Court considered Ecuador’s 
violations of its own domestic laws. According to the Kichwa, 
Ecuador entered into a partnership contract with CGC in 1996 
“without respect for the regulatory, constitutional, and conventional 
procedures set forth in domestic and international law.”85 
Significantly, the CGC did not launch the exploration phase of 
seismic prospecting until 2002,86 at which point the 1998 
Constitution and the protections it afforded to indigenous peoples 
had already been in effect for four years.87  
Additionally, by the time CGC unlawfully entered Sarayaku land, 
ILO Convention 169 had already entered into force in Ecuador and 
codified international standards for the rights to FPIC and 
consultation. Among these was the duty of party states to consult 
indigenous peoples “whenever consideration is being given to 
legislative or administrative measures which may affect them 
directly.”88 The commencement of seismic testing on indigenous 
land therefore constituted a direct breach of Ecuador’s operative 
 84. See id. ¶ 248; see also Press Release, Center for Justice and International 
Law, Inter-American Court Condemns Ecuador for Violating Rights of Indigenous 
People of Sarayaku (July 25, 2012), available at http://cejil.org/en/comunicados/ 
inter-american-court-condemns-ecuador-violating-rights-indigenous-people-
sarayaku [hereinafter Court Condemns Ecuador] (reporting that CGC had 
abandoned 1400 kilos of highly dangerous explosives in an area covering 16,000 
hectares, including zones used for hunting, fishing, and other traditional activities). 
 85. See The Kichwa Peoples of the Sarayaku Community and its Members v. 
Ecuador, Petition 167/03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 64/04 
(Admissibility), ¶ 22 (Oct. 13, 2004). 
 86. See id. ¶ 23 (explaining that the exploration phase of seismic testing was 
actually set to commence in 1997, according to the original contract between 
Ecuador and CGC). 
 87. See generally CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE ECUADOR 
[ECUADOR CONSTITUTION] 2008, art. 84 (Ecuador) (affording indigenous peoples 
the right to consultation on decisions affecting their property as well as their 
cultural and economic rights). But see Isabela Figueroa, Indigenous Peoples Versus 
Oil Companies: Constitutional Control Within Resistance, 4 SUR INT’L J. ON 
HUM. RTS. 51, 54-55 (2006) (identifying the conflict the 1998 Ecuadorian 
Constitution created by reserving the right to subsoil resources for the state even 
though most oil fields in the Ecuadorian Amazon are found on indigenous lands). 
 88. ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 6. 
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obligation to respect the rights of the Kichwa to consultation, 
participation in decision-making processes, and free and informed 
consent prior to the initiation of activities affecting their rights.  
An important outcome of Sarayaku was the Court’s elaboration on 
what constituted adequate, good faith consultations under 
international standards. Although the Court had concluded in 
Saramaka that states had a duty to carry out consultations in good 
faith “with the object of reaching an agreement,” it failed to elaborate 
on what exactly constituted “good faith.”89 In contrast, Sarayaku laid 
out specific conditions for fulfilling the good-faith requirement and 
thereby set a higher standard for states to meet when carrying out 
consultations. Importantly, the Court held that “good faith” 
necessitates an absence of any form of coercion, whether committed 
by the state or by third parties acting with the state’s authorization or 
acquiescence.90  
Applying this criterion, the Court found that CGC’s various 
coercive measures amounted to a violation by Ecuador of its 
domestic and international consultation and FPIC duties. These 
measures included circumventing the political organization of the 
Sarayaku community by contacting individual members directly; 
paying community members to recruit others to support CGC’s 
activities; and bribing individuals and groups with money, gifts, job 
offers, and other perks.91 While CGC had committed these acts 
without the state’s direct assistance, the Court held that Ecuador’s 
failure to carry out its own consultation procedures by default 
“favored a climate of conflict, division and confrontation between 
the indigenous communities of the area.”92 The Court also noted that 
the state’s provision of armed forces to CGC as a security measure 
was not conducive to fostering a climate of trust and mutual 
 89. See Saramaka, supra note 6, ¶ 133 (ordering states to hold consultations “in 
good faith, through culturally appropriate procedures and with the objective of 
reaching an agreement”). 
 90. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 186 (finding that states must treat the 
consultation requirement as more than “mere formality” and thereby aim to 
establish a “climate of mutual trust” when engaging in dialogues with indigenous 
groups). 
 91. See id. ¶¶ 73–74 (stating that the CGC lawyer offered the Sarayaku 
“US$60,000.00 for development projects and 500 jobs for the men of the 
community”). 
 92. Id. ¶ 198. 
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respect.93  
The Court’s holding in Sarayaku was also a watershed decision 
because it marked the first opinion where the Court expressly 
asserted that the duty of states to consult indigenous peoples with the 
aim of obtaining FPIC is non-delegable. The Court observed that a 
state could not avoid its consultation duty by bestowing it upon a 
private or third party, particularly if that party is the same entity 
seeking to develop the land in dispute.94 Applying this reasoning, the 
Court found that Ecuador had violated international and domestic 
law by seeking to endorse CGC’s bad-faith attempts at “socializing” 
the Sarayaku people as adequate forms of consultation. The Court 
emphasized the inappropriateness of Ecuador’s delegation of its 
consultation duty to an agent possessing an obvious conflict of 
interest, questioning the integrity of third party consultations.95  
By setting these new conditions for states to apply when 
attempting to authorize development on indigenous land, Sarayaku v. 
Ecuador expands the protective scope of the right to FPIC. Notably, 
Sarayaku fills in several of the gaps in indigenous rights protection 
left by the prior Inter-American case law discussed above as well as 
in existing international legal instruments. 
3. Brazilian Law: The 1988 Constitution and Brazil’s Internalization 
of ILO Convention 169 
As in the case of Ecuador, Brazil’s domestic consultation and 
FPIC duties to indigenous peoples are grounded partly in the state’s 
own constitution. In addition to articles affording citizens equal 
protection, the right to life, the right to property, and other 
fundamental protections,96 several provisions deal specifically with 
 93. See id. ¶¶ 190–93 (describing how Ecuador provided National Police and 
Ecuadorian Army forces to assist the CGC’s activities, thereby intimidating 
members of the Sarayaku community opposed to the company’s presence on their 
lands). 
 94. See id. ¶ 199 (noting that even a partial delegation is invalid, as it fails to 
comply with the good faith requirement and discourages a climate of respect). 
 95. See id. ¶ 188 (observing that CGC utilized its so-called consultations with 
the Kichwa as a one-sided, opportunistic attempt to negotiate its entry onto legally 
protected land). 
 96. See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.) 
[hereinafter BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION] (stating that all persons residing in Brazil 
are equal before the law and “ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty, 
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indigenous land. Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution expressly 
prohibits removing indigenous peoples from traditional lands except 
when epidemics or catastrophic events present imminent threats to 
the populations, or in the interest of national sovereignty.97 
Importantly, both the catastrophic event and national sovereignty 
exceptions authorize only the temporary removal of affected 
populations.98 
According to one scholarly analysis, a situation that would 
actually reflect a sovereignty interest is the removal of an indigenous 
population during wartime as a means of facilitating the movement 
of military troops in a region.99  
Additionally, Paragraph 3 of Article 231 states that hydric 
resources existing on indigenous land may be exploited only with 
legislative authorization and after affected communities have been 
allowed to voice their opinions on the matter.100 These hydric 
resources include “energy potentials” such as the untapped 
hydropower potential of rivers like the Xingu.  
Furthermore, by becoming a party to ILO Convention 169, Brazil 
internalized an internationally set standard for the right to 
consultation into its own domestic legal framework. ILO Convention 
169 was ratified by Brazil in 2002 and enacted via presidential 
decree on April 19, 2004.101 Although reservations to ILO 
to equality, to security, and to property,” subject to certain conditions). 
 97. See id. art. 231 (“The removal of Indian groups from their lands is 
forbidden, except ad referendum of the National Congress, in case of a catastrophe 
or an epidemic which represents a risk to their population, or in the interest of the 
sovereignty of the country, after decision by the National Congress, it being 
guaranteed that, under any circumstances, the return shall be immediate as soon as 
the risk ceases.”). 
 98. Juruna-Arara Action, supra note 44, at 17 (quoting constitutional scholar 
dos Anjos Filho as asserting that it can be inferred from the constitutional text that 
the emergency displacement of an indigenous people should always be temporary 
and last the shortest possible amount of time). 
 99. See id. at 16 (arguing that in such an event, the national security interests of 
Brazil would arguably outweigh any temporary inconveniences the state may 
impose on the population by relocating it until the threat has passed). 
 100. BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, art. 231 (“Hydric resources, 
including energetic potentials, may only be exploited . . . after hearing the 
communities involved, and the participation in the results of such mining shall be 
ensured to them, as set forth by law.”). 
 101. See Decreto No. 5.051, Diário Oficial da União (Braz.) (Apr. 19, 2004) 
(promulgating ILO Convention 169 in compliance with Legislative Decree No. 
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conventions are not permitted,102 Article 34 allows state parties to 
determine the “nature and scope” of the measures necessary to give 
effect to the convention “in a flexible manner” that accounts for the 
specific conditions and circumstances of each country.103 Despite the 
availability of this clause, the language of both the legislative decree 
adopting the convention and the enacting presidential decree 
suggests conformity with the treaty’s original text.104  
Domestic case law has affirmed Brazil’s obligations under ILO 
Convention 169. In the 2007 case of Joisael Alves v. General 
Director of the Alcântara Launch Centre,105 the court ordered an 
aerospace base to refrain from affecting a quilombola community’s 
ability to subsist on their traditionally occupied lands.106 The court 
reasoned that through its ratification of ILO Convention 169 and 
passage of Legislative Decree N° 43/2000, Brazil had “confirmed the 
intention to establish public policy to fight discrimination against the 
traditional ways of life of the indigenous and tribal peoples.”107  
Joisael Alves was significant not only because it was the first 
application of ILO Convention 169 in a Brazilian court, but also 
143). 
 102. See How International Labour Standards Are Created, ILO, 
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/ 
international-labour-standards-creation/lang--en/index.htm (observing that 
although reservations to ILO conventions are not permitted, most of the standards 
set by the agreements “reflect the fact that countries have diverse cultural and 
historical backgrounds, legal systems, and levels of economic development,” and, 
according to the ILO, these standards have thus been formulated with enough 
flexibility to be “translated into national law and practice with due consideration of 
these differences”). 
 103. See ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 34. 
 104. See Decreto Legislativo No. 143, art. 1, Senado Federal (Braz.) (June 20, 
2002) (approving the text of the Convention and declaring that any acts to revise it 
are subject to the National Congress for approval); Decreto No. 5.051, supra note 
101 (implementing Legislative Decree No. 143). 
 105. Judgment no. 027/2007/Jcm/Jf/mA, Case no. 2006.37.00.005222-7 (Feb. 
13, 2007). 
 106. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, APPLICATION OF 
CONVENTION NO. 169 BY DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN LATIN 
AMERICAN: A CASEBOOK 61 (2009), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/ 
groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_123946.pdf 
(explaining that quilombolas are African descendants who, like indigenous 
peoples, practice subsistence farming on traditional lands). 
 107. Id. (quoting Joisael Alves v. General Director of the Alcântara Launch 
Centre). 
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because it interpreted the convention’s ratification as affirming 
Brazil’s constitutional duty to promote “the well being of all” 
without discrimination.108 Subsequent decisions have likewise cited 
Brazil’s enactment of the Convention in granting indigenous groups 
protection over cultural rights and ancestral lands.109 Brazil’s 
internalization of ILO Convention 169 via legislative decisions, 
executive decrees, and supporting jurisprudence thus shows the 
operative status of the Convention under Brazil’s domestic 
framework. As such, a violation by Brazil of its indigenous peoples’ 
rights to consultation and FPIC constitutes a breach of both 
international and state law.  
III. ANALYSIS 
Although the Inter-American system’s case law may establish 
important legal precedents, the Court has refused to invoke its 
jurisprudence “as a criterion to be universally applied.”110 The Court 
instead relies on case-by-case analyses, giving consideration to the 
specific facts and circumstances at hand.111  
In Sarayaku, the Court cited to several binding legal instruments 
in deciding that Ecuador had violated its consultation and FPIC 
obligations to the Sarayaku Kichwa: Ecuador’s constitution, ILO 
Convention 169, and the American Convention on Human Rights. 
Applying the Inter-American system’s case-specific approach, this 
analysis will look to parallel and, where applicable, the same 
authorities to determine whether Brazil’s actions and omissions 
surrounding Belo Monte similarly violate international and domestic 
law.  
 108. Id. at 61 (referring to Article 3 of the Brazilian Constitution). 
 109. See, e.g., Press Release, Supremo Tribuno Federal (Federal Supreme 
Court), STF Considera Nulos Títulos de Terra Localizados em Área Indígena no 
Sul da Bahia (May 2, 2012), http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe. 
asp?idConteudo=206458 (explaining that in deciding that the Pataxó Hã-Hã-Hãe 
Indians were entitled to live on their ancestral territory undisturbed, Brazil’s 
Supreme Court invoked ILO Convention 169). 
 110. El Amparo v. Venezuela, Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 28, ¶ 
34 (Sept. 14, 1996) (conceding, however, that prior case decisions may have some 
precedential value). 
 111. See id. (comparing the fact pattern of El Amparo with those of the 
Velásquez Rodríguez and Godínez Cruz cases). 
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A. THE BELO MONTE DAM’S DEVELOPMENT VIOLATES THE 
ACHR 
Under both domestic and international law, Brazil must consult 
indigenous peoples residing within its territory on all decisions 
affecting their property and rights with the goal of obtaining their 
free, prior, and informed consent. Rather than providing an 
exhaustive overview of all of the environmental implications of Belo 
Monte, Part II.B. addresses the dam’s implications for the Xingu 
Basin’s indigenous inhabitants in relation to their traditional way of 
life and subsistence needs. Drawing from the presented facts, this 
section will assess how the Belo Monte’s development, like CGC’s 
activities on Sarayaku land, breaches Article 21 of the ACHR. By 
demonstrating that the dam jeopardizes the affected communities’ 
use and enjoyment of traditional lands, this section shows that these 
groups are in fact entitled to the rights to consultation and FPIC.  
Belo Monte’s projected impact on lands traditionally used and 
occupied by several indigenous groups constitutes a violation of 
Article 21 of the ACHR.112 Brazil may be held accountable for 
breaching its treaty obligations even though a private entity, rather 
than the state, is responsible for carrying out the construction and 
operation of the dam.113 In Sarayaku, the Court held Ecuador 
accountable for violations of the Kichwa’s land rights given the 
state’s authorization of and acquiescence to CGC’s actions.114 
Likewise, Brazil’s endorsement of Belo Monte and involvement in 
its implementation makes it liable for any injuries to property 
stemming from the project.  
The Court found Ecuador in breach of Article 21 for failing to 
consult the Sarayaku Kichwa on the execution of a project directly 
 112. See ACHR, supra note 4, art. 21 (holding that every person has the right to 
use and enjoy his or her property, but that the law may subordinate such use and 
enjoyment to societal interests). 
 113. See, e.g., Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶¶ 187–88 (implying that a state cannot 
delegate its consultation and FPIC duties to third parties, and noting that even if 
such delegation were acceptable, a state would still have the duty to supervise and 
monitor the consultation process to ensure the third party’s compliance with 
international consultation standards). 
 114. See, e.g., id. ¶ 134 (claiming Ecuador was “fully aware” that CGC was 
preventing the Kichwa from moving freely within their own land, yet did nothing 
to mitigate the problem). 
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affecting their territory.115 CGC’s extractive activities, which 
received both passive and active support from the state,116 infringed 
on the people’s land rights in various ways. Not only did the 
company enter Sarayaku territory without obtaining the community’s 
consent,117 but it also committed acts that directly harmed the 
physical landscape. These included planting dangerous explosives in 
the ground, clear-cutting vast stretches of primary forest, and 
destroying sites of cultural and spiritual value to the Kichwa.118  
The Belo Monte Dam’s anticipated implications for the Xingu 
communities’ traditional lands are comparable in terms of its effects 
on local indigenous populations. On one hand, the Brazilian 
government insists that the dam will not directly flood any 
indigenous territories.119 On the other hand, it has acknowledged the 
likelihood of outcomes that will nonetheless affect the communities’ 
ability to maintain traditional lifestyles.120 For instance, the dam’s 
 115. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 232 (ruling that Ecuador was obligated under 
both international and domestic law to take all measures necessary to ensure the 
Sarayaku people’s participation in decision-making processes concerning measures 
that could affect their property rights and way of life). 
 116. Compare id. ¶ 134 (June 27, 2012) (presenting the Commission’s 
conclusion that Ecuador had passively assisted CGC in obstructing the Kichwa’s 
freedom of movement by doing nothing to remedy the situation; the state was well 
aware that numerous obstructions were impeding the Sarayaku people’s ability to 
move freely within their territory or to voluntarily leave it at will, including 
soldiers blocking the community’s access to the river and placing explosives in 
areas used for subsistence activities), with id. ¶¶ 190–93 (describing how the 
Ecuadorian government actively assisted CGC by providing armed forces to 
protect CGC’s personnel and facilities from Sarayaku opposition, and that 
Ecuador’s provision of armed security to CGC was pursuant to a 2001 cooperation 
agreement between the state and oil companies operating in the country providing 
that the state would “guarantee the security of the oil facilities as well as of the 
persons working there”). 
 117. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 124 (explaining that Ecuador itself acknowledged 
that it had granted CGC a contract for oil exploration on Sarayaku territory without 
securing the community’s consent). 
 118. See Court Condemns Ecuador, supra note 84 (reporting that trees and 
plants sacred to the Sarayaku community were destroyed as a result of CGC’s 
actions). 
 119. See FAQS, supra note 15, at 5 (claiming that Belo Monte’s operation will 
not flood any of the ten indigenous communities located within the dam’s project 
area). But see Anaya 2010 Report, supra note 9, at 31 (presenting a non-exhaustive 
list of fifteen indigenous groups projected to be adversely affected by the dam). 
 120. See FAQS, supra note 15, at 5–6 (implying that the dam will be an 
“interference” with the traditional fishing, hunting, and farming activities of local 
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construction is expected to substantially reduce stream flow and 
leave areas of the river in permanent drought.121 Consequently, many 
communities along the river will lose access to fluvial navigation and 
become geographically isolated.122 This in turn will prevent families 
from accessing urban centers for needed social services as well as 
areas used for hunting, fishing, and other subsistence activities.123  
Furthermore, the influx of migrants into the region will also 
adversely affect the indigenous communities’ enjoyment of their 
territories and natural resources.124 The government concedes that the 
projected population boom will place a strain on the environment as 
existing populations are forced to compete with newcomers over fish 
and other resources essential to their way of life.125 Moreover, 
indigenous groups, and indicating that the state proposes to offset these impacts by 
implementing “social-environmental programs,” including those addressing 
territorial security, basic sanitation, and economic sustainability). 
 121. RIMA, supra note 36, at 112–14. 
 122. See Press Release, Amazon Watch, Amazonian Indigenous Peoples Occupy 
Belo Monte Dam Site (June 23, 2012), available at http://amazonwatch.org/news/ 
2012/0623-amazonian-indigenous-peoples-occupy-belo-monte-dam-site (reporting 
complaints that Norte Energia has thus far failed to fulfill its promise to implement 
a system that will facilitate the movement of boats near the cofferdams, whose 
construction is currently impeding fluvial travel, and that according to indigenous 
protestors, this persistent lack of access to navigable waterways will leave 
communities isolated unless they open up access roads to their villages, which will 
in turn expose their lands and resources to illegal loggers, squatter settlements, 
land speculators, and cattle ranchers). 
 123. See id. (pointing out that the city of Altamira, which is accessible only by 
river for many indigenous communities, serves as a market for goods and is the 
main source of healthcare and other essential social services); see also Press 
Release, International Rivers, Amazonian Indigenous Leaders Call for Suspension 
of Construction License for Belo Monte Dam (July 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/amazonian-indigenous-leaders-call-
for-suspension-of-construction-license-for-belo-monte (explaining that loss of 
river navigation will impede access to Altamira’s schools and medical facilities). 
 124. See Construction Ban Overturned, supra note 20 (arguing that the 
commencement of construction may “provoke chaos in terms of social 
infrastructure in the region of Altamira,” considering that approximately 100,000 
people are expected to migrate to the area to seek employment at the dam). 
 125. See RIMA, supra note 36, at 114–16 (predicting that the dam’s 
construction will result in changes in the types of fish species available in the 
Xingu, and that because some of the species expected to flourish have high 
economic value, the government believes that conflicts between existing fishing 
communities and new, opportunistic fishermen may result); see also id. at 131–32 
(observing the possibility that the Xingu Basin will experience increased gold 
mining activity, particularly along stretches of the river where the stream flow will 
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experts also claim that opportunistic settlers looking to exploit 
indigenous territories for gold and other valuable commodities may 
provoke violent land wars.126 By exposing the Xingu’s indigenous 
peoples to these very probable threats to their land rights, the 
Brazilian government is in breach of its duties under the ACHR.  
Moreover, the Court interprets Article 21 to protect not only land 
claims, but also to protect indigenous peoples’ cultural viability, 
including “the development and continuation of their worldview.”127 
In fact, the Court has stated that the right to restitution in cases of 
expropriation is enforceable only so long as the indigenous group has 
retained spiritual and material ties to the land at issue. In Sarayaku, 
the Court found it important to consider the “profound cultural, 
intangible and spiritual ties” of the Kichwa to their territory to fully 
understand the damage Ecuador and CGC’s actions caused.128 
According to the Court, Ecuador compromised the Kichwa’s cultural 
integrity by passively supporting CGC’s devastation of sacred sites 
and interference with ritual activities. 
Likewise, Brazil’s endorsement of Belo Monte threatens the 
Xingu indigenous groups’ cultural and spiritual existence. Foremost, 
the dam’s development and operation will interfere with the ability 
of local peoples to subsist. As discussed, some of the projected 
impacts include the decimation of local fish stocks, the inundation of 
lands used for agriculture and other subsistence activities, and the 
desiccation of large areas of the basin, including sites used for 
hunting and gathering.129 By preventing indigenous groups from 
be substantially lower, and that the Ministry of Mines and Energy posits that this 
may lead to tensions between the newcomers and existing indigenous groups, as 
well as increased environmental pressure on indigenous land). 
 126. See, e.g., Christian Poirier, Belo Sun Mining Sets Sights on Golden 
Opportunity in the Xingu, AMAZON WATCH (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://amazonwatch.org/news/2012/1005-belo-sun-mining-sets-sights-on-golden-
opportunity-in-the-xingu (stating that Canadian corporation Belo Sun Mining is 
among the international mining companies already formulating plans to mine gold 
along the stretches of the Xingu that Belo Monte’s development will leave 
desiccated; if permitted, “the Xingu would become a scavenger’s feast” because 
these mining operations would further degrade water quality in the Xingu Basin 
and contaminate local fish stocks, which damming activities already threaten to 
substantially diminish). 
 127. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 146. 
 128. Id. ¶ 149 (noting the non-pecuniary costs of CGC’s conduct). 
 129. See supra Part II.A.2 (noting the dam’s impacts). 
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performing their traditional subsistence practices, Belo Monte 
infringes on their cultural and economic use of traditionally occupied 
lands. This violates Article 21 of the ACHR, according to its 
interpretative history as established by Awas Tingni and developed 
by subsequent cases.130  
Furthermore, the region’s native peoples regard the Xingu as the 
birthplace of civilization; its destruction would thus constitute a 
“cosmological catastrophe” for local groups like the Arara and the 
Juruna.131 By supporting a project that poses an imminent threat to 
both the Xingu communities’ physical and cultural enjoyment of 
lands they traditionally occupy or use, Brazil, like Ecuador, has 
violated Article 21.  
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BELO MONTE DAM VIOLATES THE 
FPIC STANDARD SET BY THE SARAYAKU DECISION 
1. Belo Monte’s Development and Operation Violates Sarayaku’s 
Proscription Against the Use of Coercion 
Brazil’s acts and omissions surrounding Belo Monte’s 
development breach Sarayaku’s proscription against coercion. The 
Inter-American Court’s requirement that consultations be carried out 
in “good faith” necessitates an absence of coercive measures by the 
state or third parties acting with the state’s authorization or 
acquiescence.132 The Brazilian state’s passive tolerance of Norte 
Energia’s deceptive and opportunistic tactics during so-called 
negotiations thus violates this condition.  
 130. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 131. Diamond and Poirier, supra note 39, at 30; see also BELO MONTE: 
MASSIVE DAM PROJECT STRIKES AT THE HEART OF THE AMAZON, INTERNATIONAL 
RIVERS 2 (2012), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-
files/Belo_Monte_FactSheet_May2012.pdf (quoting José Carlos Arara, an 
indigenous Xingu resident, as telling former president Lula: “Our ancestors are 
there inside this land, our blood is inside the land, and we have to pass on this land 
with the story of our ancestors to our children. We don’t want to fight, but we are 
ready to fight for our land if we are threatened. We want to live on our land in 
peace with all that we have there”). 
 132. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶¶ 185–86 (invoking the language of Article 6 of 
ILO Convention 169, which also requires that the consultations be carried out in 
good faith with the goal of reaching an agreement or obtaining consent to the 
proposed measures). 
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Norte Energia’s coercive practices during its apparently 
“asymmetric” talks with the Xingu Basin’s indigenous communities 
are reminiscent of CGC’s interactions with the Sarayaku Kichwa.133 
For example, during a public audience Norte Energia held in July 
2012, the company evidently took advantage of attendees who spoke 
little Portuguese by allowing biased translations to distort their 
messages to the company’s president.134 In a similar manner, CGC 
defrauded the Kichwa when it obtained signatures for a letter of 
support to the company under false pretenses.135  
Furthermore, Belo Monte developers have apparently taken 
advantage of old divisions between the indigenous groups of the 
Xingu Basin to aggravate already existing tensions.136 This, in turn, 
has undermined the solidarity of the joint movement against the dam 
and made it more difficult for involved parties to reach an 
agreement.137 Comparably, CGC deliberately fueled conflicts 
between the Kichwa and neighboring indigenous groups, as well as 
between Sarayaku families themselves, to further its development 
agenda. For instance, in order to break the Kichwa’s social cohesion, 
CGC circumvented the political organization of the community by 
contacting individuals directly to offer them money bribes and other 
perks in exchange for their support.138 As Sarayaku affirmed, such 
measures are inherently coercive and violate the good faith 
 133. After 21 Days, supra note 28 (stating that the talks were disillusioning and 
unbalanced, according to the attendees). 
 134. Id. (explaining that the Xikrin came into contact with nationalist society for 
the first time relatively recently, and consequently speak very little Portuguese.) 
Apparently, the Xikrin only agreed to stop occupying the dam site after a series of 
“confusing and poorly translated” sessions with Norte Energia’s president. The 
influential Xikrin warriors’ withdrawal from the protest subsequently put an end to 
the occupation. Id. 
 135. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶¶ 73, 194 (describing how CGC had members of 
the Sarayaku communities sign a list to indicate interest in the company’s offer to 
send a medical team to the villages free of cost. CGC evidently then 
misrepresented the list as a letter of support indicating the communities’ consent to 
CGC’s presence and oil exploration activities on the communities’ lands). 
 136. See Belo Monte Agrava, supra note 29 (quoting Belo Monte expert Rodolfo 
Salm as claiming that dam developers are using a colonial-era tactic of pitting 
“Indian against Indian” in order to undermine their solidarity). 
 137. See id. (describing the conflicting goals of the Xikrin and the Kayapo). 
 138. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 74 (noting that the state of Ecuador has not 
disputed these allegations of bribery). 
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requirement of the consultation duty.139 
The fact that Norte Energia, as opposed to state officials, carried 
out these coercive acts does not relieve Brazil of liability. Although 
CGC had defrauded the Kichwa unilaterally without the direct 
assistance of Ecuador, the Court in Sarayaku noted that the state’s 
failure to carry out its own consultation procedures by default 
favored a climate of “conflict, division and confrontation between 
the indigenous communities of the area.”140 Likewise, the Brazilian 
government’s failure to host state-sponsored consultations 
conforming to international FPIC standards denied the Xingu 
communities a better alternative forum to Norte Energia’s 
unbalanced, coercive negotiations.  
2. Belo Monte’s Development and Operation Violates Sarayaku’s 
Requirement of the Duty to Consult  
The Brazilian government’s conspicuous absence from decisive 
stages of the dialogues between Belo Monte developers and affected 
communities constitutes a violation of the Sarayaku standard. The 
Court’s holding in Sarayaku stressed the fact that the duty to consult 
indigenous peoples belongs exclusively to the state.141 A state 
therefore cannot delegate the duty of planning and carrying out 
adequate consultations to a third, non-state party, particularly if that 
party is the same entity seeking to develop the land at dispute. In the 
Court’s view, even a partial delegation is invalid, as it both fails to 
comply with the good faith requirement and discourages a climate of 
respect.142  
Ecuador conceded that CGC, as opposed to state representatives, 
took measures to reach an “understanding” with the Kichwa.143 This 
process of socializing community members not only included the use 
 139. Id. ¶ 194 (stating that the actions taken in an attempt to legitimize oil 
exploration activities “failed to respect the established structures of authority and 
representation within and outside the communities”). 
 140. Id. ¶ 198 (observing that the evident disconnect between CGC’s public 
meetings and “a clear determination to seek consensus” contributed to conflict). 
 141. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 199 (holding that the state had acted 
“inappropriately” by trying to delegate this duty). 
 142. See id. (finding the state’s partial delegation to be a violation of the 
people’s right to participation). 
 143. See id. ¶ 203 (stating that CGC attempted to directly negotiate with the 
Kichwa using measures that did not respect the Kichwa’s political organization). 
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of the coercive tactics mentioned above, but also was conducted 
without state supervision.144 Accordingly, the talks were not so much 
a balanced, collaborative exchange as a one-sided attempt by a self-
interested company to haggle its way into entering legally protected 
land. As such, the Court held that CGC’s actions did not amount to 
the “appropriate and accessible consultation” required by law.145  
Brazil’s absence during crucial junctures of the talks between 
Norte Energia and the Xingu communities likewise violates the 
state’s consultation duties under Sarayaku.146 The decision affords 
indigenous peoples the rights to participation and consultation at all 
stages of a project’s planning and implementation. Norte Energia’s 
commercial stakes in the hydroelectric project, however, creates a 
conflict of interest that undermines the affected communities’ 
exercise of these rights. As in the case of CGC and the Sarayaku 
Kichwa, dialogues between Norte Energia representatives and the 
Xingu indigenous groups have been unbalanced and highly 
contentious.147 In fact, during the July 2012 talks, the communities 
became so dissatisfied with Norte Energia’s lack of cooperation that 
they detained three of the company’s engineers on tribal lands.148  
Finally, Sarayaku holds that even when indigenous groups 
independently reach agreements with third parties, the state must 
play a supervisory role to ensure that the groups’ rights are being 
respected.149 The lack of state representatives at multiple meetings 
 144. See id. ¶ 189 (asserting that Ecuador therefore could not ensure that CGC 
had respected the rights of the community). 
 145. Id. ¶ 203 (noting the obvious conflict of interest). 
 146. See After 21 Days, supra note 28 (explaining that FUNAI and IBAMA 
were “conspicuously absent” from the series of talks between Norte Energia and 
the affected communities held during the occupation of the dam site in July 2012, 
despite both organizations being present that very month at Brasilia-based 
discussions authorizing the final diversion of Xingu’s flow). 
 147. See id. (describing the asymmetric negotiating process and the views of 
indigenous and non-indigenous opponents of the dam who had attended the public 
dialogues which Norte Energia held in July 2012). 
 148. See Broken Promises, supra note 32 (explaining that the incident occurred 
after a series of fruitless negotiations, during which Norte Energia proposed a 
system that would allow indigenous vessels to navigate sections of the river that 
the dam will dry out; however, the communities shot down the “ludicrous” plan, 
attempting instead to address the various socio-environmental safeguards Norte 
Energia has thus far failed to implement). 
 149. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 167 (providing that the state must protect 
indigenous peoples from infringements on their rights by monitoring and 
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held between Norte Energia and the Xingu communities is thus 
unacceptable under the Sarayaku standard. 
3. Belo Monte’s Development and Operation Violates Sarayaku’s 
Requirement that Consultations be Informed 
Brazil’s failure to adequately educate the Xingu communities 
about Belo Monte and its projected impact violates Sarayaku’s 
information requirement for the right to FPIC. With regard to 
development schemes, in order to be fully informed, indigenous 
peoples must be aware of all of the potential risks associated with the 
proposed project. As both Saramaka and Sarayaku provide, these 
risks include not only objective measures of the project’s physical 
effect on the land, but also potential cultural and health risks.150 
Sarayaku reiterated that the state must actively provide relevant 
information to affected communities and maintain constant 
communication throughout the project’s life cycle.151 Only through 
such measures can a state verify that the indigenous group can make 
decisions regarding the project “knowingly and voluntarily.”152  
In Sarayaku, the Court held that CGC’s “socialization” of the 
Kichwa did not constitute an informed consultation process.153 The 
Court observed that there was no evidence that CGC’s actions served 
to educate locals about the advantages and disadvantages of the oil 
exploration on their way of life.154 Also, because a state cannot 
delegate its consultation duty to third parties, CGC’s failure to 
adequately inform amounted to a violation by Ecuador of its FPIC 
supervising third-party or public sector measures, deploying “effective means to 
safeguard those rights through the corresponding judicial organs”). 
 150. See Saramaka, supra note 6, ¶ 133 (affirming that Suriname should have 
given the Saramakas early notice of all of the potential risks associated with the 
planned development, including environmental and health risks, “in order that the 
proposed development or investment plan is accepted knowingly and voluntarily”); 
Sarayaku, supra note 2, ¶ 205 (citing Saramaka and thereby affirming the criteria 
set). 
 151. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 208 (holding that the duty of constant 
communication requires states to both receive and provide information). 
 152. Id. ¶ 205. 
 153. Id. ¶ 209 (stating that the “socialization” process did not include an 
environmental impact assessment, allow for active participation, or inform the 
Kichwa about the benefits and drawbacks of the project). 
 154. See id. (asserting that CGC had not thoroughly presented the findings of its 
EIA to the community). 
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obligations.  
Likewise, the Brazilian state has not taken effective measures to 
ensure that the Xingu communities are fully aware of Belo Monte’s 
possible impacts. Foremost, in 2009, the state made its very 
technical, 20,000-page EIA publicly available only two days before 
holding public meetings.155 This made it virtually impossible for 
attendees to become properly acquainted with the highly complex 
project before engaging in the dialogues. Furthermore, these 
meetings were held in urban areas difficult to access by the affected 
communities, who reside in more remote locations.156 Indigenous 
groups were dissuaded from attending given the costs and 
inconvenience of travel and thus were unable to access information 
essential to their understanding of Belo Monte. Finally, reports of 
mediocre and biased translators shed doubt on the ability of Norte 
Energia to effectively communicate with the meetings’ participants 
and convey information to them in a neutral, non-coercive manner.157 
Accordingly, under Sarayaku, Brazil has not adequately complied 
with the crucial information component of its FPIC duty.  
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BELO MONTE DAM VIOLATES THE 
BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION 
Just as Ecuador violated its own constitution by authorizing and 
assisting CGC’s activities,158 Brazil’s endorsement of Belo Monte 
violates several Brazilian constitutional provisions. Foremost, the 
hydroelectric project fails to meet Article 231’s exception to the bar 
 155. See Anaya 2010 Report, supra note 9, at 32 (noting that the lengthy study 
comprised 36 different volumes). 
 156. See id. (noting that the talks were held in urban areas, even though the dam 
will not directly affect urban dwellers). 
 157. See, e.g., After 21 Days, supra note 28 (reporting that the Xikrin only 
consented to withdrawing from an inter-community protest of the dam after 
participating in a series of “confusing and poorly translated” sessions with Norte 
Energia’s president). The Xikrin are known to have a very small grasp of the 
Portuguese language given their limited contact with nationalist society, which 
allowed Norte Energia representatives to easily influence the dialogues by using 
biased translators. Id. 
 158. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 168 (noting that the Article 57 
“comprehensively” protects the rights of indigenous peoples, including by 
affording them the right to free, prior, and informed consultation on development 
activities which could potentially have an environmental or cultural impact on 
them). 
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against removing indigenous peoples from their lands.159 The 
catastrophic event and national sovereignty exceptions authorize 
only the temporary removal of affected populations.160 Belo Monte’s 
development, however, will cause irreversible environmental 
damage that will render human habitation in large stretches of the 
Xingu Basin virtually “impossible.”161  
For example, scientists expect the dam’s development to leave 
formerly fertile sections of the Xingu Basin in perpetual drought, 
threatening food and water security for indigenous groups living in 
the area.162 The dam’s effects on the flow of the Xingu will also lead 
to the deterioration of water quality and the growth of aquatic plants 
harmful to humans and the fish they consume.163 Thus, even areas of 
the basin that are not flooded will experience stresses that will render 
them unfit for human habitation for an indeterminate period of time. 
While Brazil has not explicitly ordered the removal of any 
indigenous groups,164 the dam’s adverse effects on indigenous lands 
and livelihoods nonetheless will likely cause populations to relocate 
 159. See BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, art. 231 (forbidding the 
removal of Indians from their lands “except ad referendum of the National 
Congress, in case of a catastrophe or an epidemic which represents a risk to their 
population, or in the interest of the sovereignty of the country”). 
 160. See id. (declaring the state’s return of displaced peoples to their land “shall 
be immediate as soon as the risk ceases”). 
 161. Juruna-Arara Action, supra note 44, at 6–8 (stating that the areas of the Big 
Bend currently occupied by the Juruna and Arara will not be able to sustain the 
populations once Belo Monte is built due to the projected environmental stresses of 
the dam); see also RIMA, supra note 36, at 16, 111–14 (describing how the Belo 
Monte’s mandatory inundation of over 500 square kilometers of the basin will 
permanently alter vast stretches of land, flooding some areas while drying out 
others). 
 162. See, e.g., 10 Myths, supra note 38 (postulating that the dam will lead to 
“immeasurable environmental harm”). 
 163. See RIMA, supra note 36, at 116–17 (noting that the rotting of inundated 
vegetation following the formation of reservoirs may contribute to the proliferation 
of harmful plant life). 
 164. Compare FAQS, supra note 15, at 5 (asserting that dam operations will not 
flood any of the indigenous communities falling within the project area) and 
Phillips, supra note 11 (quoting Carlos Minc, Brazil’s environment minister, as 
claiming that “[n]ot a single Indian will be displaced,” while conceding that some 
indigenous communities will be “indirectly affected”), with 10 Myths, supra note 
38 (explaining that the state considers only areas which will be flooded by dams as 
being directly affected, but even so-called “indirect” impacts, such as loss of river 
access and decimation of faunal species, will “undoubtedly” displace indigenous 
populations from their traditional lands). 
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to more habitable areas.165 Because Article 231 does not expressly 
define “removal” as an active measure, Brazil’s authorization of a 
project very likely to displace several indigenous groups is still 
unconstitutional as a passive act of removal.166  
Moreover, Belo Monte’s direct and indirect displacement of entire 
populations fails to satisfy Article 231’s national sovereignty 
exception to the bar against forcible removal.167 As discussed, the 
phrase, “in the interest of the sovereignty of the country,” must be 
interpreted narrowly to prevent deliberate and opportunistic 
manipulation of the constitutional text.168 Accordingly, only critical 
situations of national security would justify Brazil’s temporary 
violation of indigenous land rights.169 In contrast, the major costs and 
inefficiencies associated with Belo Monte shed doubt on Brazil’s 
claim that the dam is crucial for the country’s development.170 
Therefore, the national sovereignty exception does not apply.  
Additionally, Brazil’s authorization of Belo Monte violates Article 
 165. See, e.g., E.L. LA ROVERE & F.E. MENDES, WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, 
TUCURUÍ HYDROPOWER COMPLEX BRAZIL xv (2000) (describing how an outbreak 
of Mansonia mosquitoes following the construction of the Tucuruí Hydropower 
Complex created such a public health risk and general nuisance that some residents 
were forced to abandon daily farming activities and eventually relocate to 
unaffected areas); see also Jampolsky, supra note 8, at 245 (stating that between 
20,000 and 40,000 people will be displaced by large-scale flooding, degradation of 
fisheries, loss of river access, and other impacts). 
 166. BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, art. 231 (providing that the 
displacement of indigenous populations in general is lawful pursuant only to 
limited exceptions, none of which condone passive removal). 
 167. Id. (permitting removal pursuant to sovereignty interests). 
 168. Juruna-Arara Action, supra note 44, at 16. 
 169. See, e.g., id. (offering the example of the state removing an indigenous 
population during wartime to facilitate the movement of troops). According to 
scholar dos Anjos Filho, in such an event, the national security interests of Brazil 
would arguably outweigh any temporary inconveniences the state may impose on 
the population by relocating it until the threat has passed. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., Wilson Cabral de Sousa Júnior & John Reid, Uncertainties in 
Amazon Hydropower Development: Risk Scenarios and Environmental Issues 
around the Belo Monte Dam, in 3 WATER ALTERNATIVES 249, 258 (2010) 
(assessing the environmental impacts of the dam to calculate the project’s total 
costs, which the study concludes are seventy-two percent likely to outweigh the 
benefits); see also 10 Myths, supra note 38 (arguing that while the state claims that 
Belo Monte is essential to meeting the country’s energy needs, as much as thirty 
percent of the hydropower generated will actually go to inefficient industrial 
operations, such as mining). 
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231’s legislative requirement. Even if the dam’s development does in 
fact constitute a “relevant public interest of the Union,” the state’s 
infringement on indigenous property rights pursuant to this interest is 
only valid with the passage of a supplementary law.171 According to 
public prosecutors and multiple court decisions, the National 
Congress’s vote in favor of Belo Monte and enactment of Legislative 
Decree 788/2005 was invalid and thus does not satisfy this 
requirement.172  
In Sarayaku, the Court cited Ecuador’s constitution to demonstrate 
that the state fully recognized the right of indigenous peoples to 
consultation, even in its own state laws.173 Specifically, the Court 
referred to Article 57, which provides that Ecuador must carry out 
“free, prior, and informed consultation” with indigenous peoples on 
any project that may have an environmental or cultural impact on 
them.174 While the Brazilian constitution does not contain as express 
a provision on the right to consultation,175 it does recognize that 
international treaties to which Brazil is a party provide 
 171. BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, art. 231 (“Acts with a view to 
occupation, domain and possession of [Indian] lands . . . are null and void, 
producing no legal effects, except in case of relevant public interest of the Union, 
as provided by a supplementary law . . . .”). 
 172. See, e.g., Court Halts Belo Monte Project, supra note 19 (reporting Judge 
Prudente as affirming that Congress can only authorize development that may 
affect indigenous lands and rights after consulting the relevant communities, but 
the National Congress held its legislative vote concerning Belo Monte’s 
authorization before ensuring any consultations with the Xingu Basin’s indigenous 
peoples were carried out). 
 173. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 168 (observing that Ecuador’s 2008 
constitution “comprehensively” protects indigenous peoples, and that James 
Anaya, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, even 
called the Constitution one of the most “advanced” and “exemplary” in terms of 
recognizing indigenous rights). 
 174. Id. at 46 n.219 (citing Article 57 of the 2008 Constitution, which holds if 
the state is unable to obtain the consent of the consulted people on the proposed 
measure, it must then refer to the steps provided for by the Constitution and the 
law to determine its next plan of action). 
 175. But see BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 96, art. 231 (stipulating that 
the state may allow the exploitation of hydric resources and “mineral riches” 
located in indigenous land only after receiving congressional authorization and 
“hearing the communities involved”). While this provision seems to imply that the 
state must hold some form of prior consultation with the indigenous peoples whose 
lands are to be exploited, there is no explicit consent requirement. Id. 
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supplementary protections enforceable under domestic law.176  
Thus, because Brazil has failed to satisfy any of the constitutional 
criteria that would validate Belo Monte’s infringement on indigenous 
rights, it is bound to uphold the additional rights recognized by the 
ACHR and ILO Convention 169. These protections, the rights to 
consultation and FPIC, attach to the indigenous property and cultural 
rights already recognized in Article 231 of the constitution. 
Accordingly, Brazil, like Ecuador, has violated its own laws by 
endorsing a project without first consulting the affected indigenous 
groups and securing their free, prior, and informed consent.  
D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BELO MONTE DAM VIOLATES ILO 
CONVENTION 169 
Brazil’s authorization of Belo Monte violates ILO Convention 
169’s consultation and FPIC provisions,177 thereby undermining 
Brazil’s internalization of the treaty.178 By the time CGC unlawfully 
entered Kichwa land, ILO Convention 169 had already entered into 
force in Ecuador and codified an internationally agreed-upon set of 
protections to indigenous peoples.179 Brazil’s congressional approval 
of Belo Monte likewise occurred one year after a presidential decree 
officially incorporated the treaty into Brazilian law.180 Like Ecuador, 
 176. Id. art. 5 (LXXVII) (declaring that rights holders may derive additional 
protections that the Constitution does not expressly provide from international 
treaties to which Brazil is a party). 
 177. See generally ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, arts. 6–8 (affording 
indigenous peoples the rights to consultation and to free, prior, and informed 
consent on matters affecting their social, economic, and cultural development). 
 178. See Press Release, Amazon Watch, ILO Says Brazil Violated Convention 
169 in Belo Monte Case (Mar. 7, 2012), available at 
http://amazonwatch.org/news/2012/0307-ilo-says-brazil-violated-convention-169-
in-belo-monte-case (summarizing an ILO report claiming that Brazil had violated 
Article 15 of ILO Convention 169 by failing to hold hearings in the villages of the 
indigenous groups affected by Belo Monte’s development). 
 179. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 172 (asserting that Ecuador assumed an 
international commitment to guarantee its indigenous peoples the right to 
consultation upon ratifying ILO Convention 169 in 1998). 
 180. Compare Decreto No. 5.051, supra note 101 (promulgating ILO 
Convention 169 in 2004, thereby officially incorporating the treaty’s provisions 
into domestic law), with Decreto Legislativo No. 788, Diário Oficial da União 
(Braz.) (July 13, 2005) (authorizing the Executive to implement the Belo Monte 
Dam’s development in 2005, one year after Brazil’s presidential enactment of ILO 
Convention 169). 
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Brazil ratified the Convention without modifying the original text or 
conditioning its provisions, despite the availability of a flexibility 
clause.181 Accordingly, as in the case of Ecuador, Brazil’s violation 
of ILO Convention 169 directly breaches both domestic and 
international law.  
By permitting construction on Belo Monte to commence without 
first attempting to secure the willful and informed consent of affected 
indigenous groups, Brazil violated the plain language of ILO 
Convention 169. Article 6 requires that states undertake 
consultations “in good faith and in a form appropriate to the 
circumstances,” with the goal of achieving consent or agreement on 
the proposed measures.182 As argued, both Ecuador and Brazil have 
failed to meet the good faith criterion due to their acquiescence to 
third parties’ inherently coercive measures during so-called 
consultations. CGC, for example, obtained signatures of support for 
its seismic activities under false pretenses.183 Comparably, Norte 
Energia allowed translators to distort the messages indigenous 
community members had them relay to the company’s president.184 
Moreover, like Ecuador, Brazil has demonstrated a lack of a good 
faith commitment to reaching a consensus with the Xingu Basin’s 
indigenous groups. Indeed, the limited dialogues that the state and 
Norte Energia held with some of the affected communities did not 
offer conditions conducive to cooperation and mutual exchange. In a 
recent meeting, members of the Juruna and Arara communities 
became so dissatisfied with Norte Energia’s persistent evasion of 
their demands that they detained three company employees in 
protest.185 Norte Energia’s public meetings have also included 
 181. See Decreto Legislativo No. 143, supra note 104 (approving the text of the 
Convention without proposing any modifications or conditions). 
 182. ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 6. 
 183. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 194 (presenting the Commission’s 
undisputed allegations that CGC employees fraudulently obtained the signatures 
by instructing individuals to sign a list to indicate their interest in the CGC’s offer 
to send free medical teams to their communities). 
 184. See After 21 Days, supra note 28 (arguing that the Xikrin were especially 
vulnerable given their limited Portuguese skills). 
 185. See Broken Promises, supra note 32 (explaining that the Juruna and Arara 
communities who carried out the non-violent detention were frustrated by Norte 
Energia’s failure to present practical proposals for mitigating the dam’s imminent 
social and environmental impacts on their communities and lands). 
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attempts to buy the attendees’ complacence in order to avoid 
addressing indigenous demands. For example, during talks in July 
2012, the consortium offered communities various perks while 
refusing to set a timetable for meeting legally mandated 
environmental and social conditions.186 Comparably, CGC tried to 
buy members of the Sarayaku community’s consent by offering 
bribes and paying individuals to rally support for its unlawful 
presence on Kichwa lands.  
Additionally, by failing to consult the Xingu Basin’s indigenous 
peoples during the planning and evaluation phases of Belo Monte’s 
development, Brazil violated Article 7 of Convention 169. Article 7 
requires states to ensure that studies assessing the social, spiritual, 
cultural, and environmental impact of planned development projects 
are carried out “in cooperation with the peoples concerned.”187 In 
Sarayaku, the Court found Ecuador in breach of its Article 7 duty by 
failing to ensure the Sarayaku people’s participation in the study 
CGC subcontracted a private agency to carry out.188  
Similarly, not only did Eletrobras conduct its EIA for Belo Monte 
without engaging local indigenous groups, but it also failed to 
adequately communicate its findings to affected communities after 
the fact.189 Thus, groups like the Juruna and the Arara, who experts 
claim will face significant hardships as a result of the dam’s 
development, have had no influence over any stages of the planning 
process—neither those preceding the EIA nor those following its 
completion. Indeed, as Brazilian courts have indicated, the 
 186. See Diamond & Poirier, supra note 39, at 29 (stating that some of the 
“compensation” packages Norte Energia offered simply included social services 
the constitution already guarantees to indigenous peoples, but the consortium and 
the media were able to treat these services as handouts because of lack of 
information on part of the communities, many of which have very limited contact 
with nationalist society). 
 187. ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 7 (stipulating that during the 
consultation processes surrounding a development scheme, states should refer to 
the findings of impact studies as “fundamental criteria” for implementing the 
proposed project). 
 188. See Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 207. 
 189. See, e.g., Anaya 2010 Report, supra note 9, at 32 (observing that the 
official EIA for Belo Monte, which consisted of 36 volumes and 20,000 pages, was 
not publicly available until two days before Norte Energia’s public audiences, 
making it virtually impossible for communities to become familiar with the highly 
technical scheme before attending the meetings). 
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government did not even consult the affected indigenous peoples 
before authorizing a legislative vote on the dam.190 This is in direct 
breach of the ILO’s requirement that states involve affected 
indigenous groups “in the [decision-making] process as soon as 
possible” and at all phases of the process of drafting legislation.191  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. BRAZIL SHOULD SUSPEND WORK ON BELO MONTE UNTIL IT 
RECEIVES THE AFFECTED INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES’ CONSENT 
FOLLOWING GOOD-FAITH CONSULTATIONS CONFORMING TO THE 
SARAYAKU STANDARD 
Although Sarayaku formally binds only on Ecuador,192 Brazil 
should nonetheless conform to the standard set and suspend Belo 
Monte’s development until it fulfills its consultation and FPIC duties. 
The Xingu communities already filed a complaint against Brazil 
before the IACHR and a case before the Court is likely imminent.193 
Given the strong factual and legal parallels between the Sarayaku 
and Belo Monte disputes, it is highly likely that the Court would find 
Brazil also in violation of international and domestic law for its acts 
and omissions surrounding Belo Monte.194 Both parties, the Brazilian 
government and the Xingu communities, could thus benefit greatly 
by avoiding the costs and inconveniences of litigation by reaching a 
balanced agreement conforming to Sarayaku’s FPIC standard, before 
 190. See Court Halts Belo Monte Project, supra note 19 (explaining that one of 
Judge Prudente’s reasons for halting Belo Monte’s construction was because the 
government had yet to fulfill this legally-mandated condition). 
 191. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 181; see also Report of the Committee 
Established to Examine the Claim Alleging Non-Compliance by Colombia of the 
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 1989 (No. 169), filed under Article 
24 of the ILO Constitution by the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, GB.276/17/1; 
GB.282/14/3 (1999), ¶ 90 (responding to a complaint alleging Colombia’s non-
compliance with Convention 169). 
 192. See ACHR, supra note 4, art. 68 (providing that states shall comply with 
the judgment of the Court “in any case to which they are parties”). 
 193. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River 
Basin, Pará, Brazil, PM 382/10, Apr. 1, 2011 (precautionary measures) (finding 
for the Xingu communities and recommending that Brazil halt Belo Monte’s 
construction until it fulfills its consultation and FPIC obligations). 
 194. See supra Part III (demonstrating that Brazil and Ecuador violated parallel 
as well as the same legal instruments through their acts and omissions surrounding 
Belo Monte and CGC’s exploration activities, respectively). 
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a lawsuit is necessary. 
B. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM SHOULD FURTHER EXTEND THE 
RIGHTS TO CONSULTATION AND FPIC BY REQUIRING THE 
PRESENCE OF NEUTRAL THIRD-PARTY MEDIATORS DURING STATE 
CONSULTATIONS 
As Ecuador and Brazil have both demonstrated, states cannot 
always be trusted to act in the interest of groups theoretically under 
their protection, particularly when economic interests are involved. 
In the case of Belo Monte, for instance, the Brazilian state has been 
the driving force behind the dam’s development, allowing the project 
to survive several challenges to its legitimacy and to circumvent 
domestic and international law.195 Likewise, Ecuador permitted 
CGC’s presence on Kichwa land despite its awareness of the 
company’s unlawful conduct.196  
By requiring a neutral third party to monitor and mediate 
consultations, the OAS can ensure that a state’s biased interests do 
not prevent indigenous peoples affected by government-sponsored 
development from realizing their rights. The IACHR’s Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Populations could potentially 
serve as a mediator, using his or her observations of the consultations 
to assist the Court in determining the state’s liability in the event of 
litigation.197 Conversely, the Rapporteur could offer 
recommendations directly to the state during the course of the 
consultations themselves, helping affected parties avoid litigation. 
Whether such recommendations could be immediately binding 
would be for the Inter-American system’s legal organs and OAS 
states to decide.  
 
 195. See Background, supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the various procedural 
illegalities Brazil tolerated in order to facilitate Belo Monte’s authorization). 
 196. See, e.g., Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 134 (noting that Ecuador was “fully 
aware” that CGC was obstructing the Sarayaku Kichwa’s freedom of movement 
and other guaranteed rights). 
 197. Such a task would be consistent with the Rapporteur’s mandate to “support 
onsite visits to OAS member countries in order to delve more deeply into the 
observation of the general situation or to investigate particular situations involving 
indigenous peoples . . . .” Mandate, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/ 
mandate/Functions.asp (last visited July 26, 2013). 
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C. ILO CONVENTION 169 SHOULD BE REVISED TO ENDORSE THE 
SARAYAKU STANDARD 
Sarayaku sets a higher standard for the right to free, prior, and 
informed consent than ILO Convention 169 and other existing 
international documents concerning indigenous rights.198 For 
instance, whereas Article 6 of the convention merely states that 
consultations must be undertaken “in good faith and in a form 
appropriate to the circumstances,”199 Sarayaku clearly articulates that 
“good faith” requires the absence of any coercive measures, 
including actions targeted at breaking the social cohesion of the 
community in question.200 Furthermore, while the convention is 
silent on whether a state may transfer its consultation duties to a third 
party, Sarayaku explicitly holds that the duty to consult is entirely a 
state responsibility. Thus, a state cannot avoid properly planning and 
carrying out good faith, culturally appropriate dialogues by 
delegating the task to a non-state third party.201  
Because several non-OAS states have ratified ILO Convention 
169, revising the agreement to include these new, more stringent 
standards could result in increased indigenous rights protection in a 
greater geographic area than solely states falling within the Inter-
American system’s jurisdiction.202 Repeated evocation of the norms 
 198. See, e.g., UNDRIP, supra note 49, art. 19 (providing that states must carry 
out consultations in “good faith,” but failing to qualify what exactly constitutes a 
good faith dialogue). 
 199. ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 6. 
 200. Sarayaku, supra note 1, ¶ 186 (proclaiming that consultations should be 
conducted in a “climate of mutual trust” and that “good faith” is incompatible with 
attempts to break the social cohesion of communities, which contradicts 
international standards calling for collective decision-making). 
 201. See id. ¶ 187 (emphasizing that it is counterintuitive for a state to delegate 
its consultation duties to the very party interested in developing the land at 
dispute). 
 202. Denmark, Nepal, Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, and the Central African 
Republic all have ratified the Convention. While neither Spain nor the Netherlands 
have indigenous peoples traditionally residing within their territories, the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(“CEACR”) has expressed its support of Spain’s ratification of ILO Convention 
169 and its belief that such ratifications could “contribute positively towards the 
ratification of the Convention by other countries, even those that do not have 
indigenous and tribal peoples.” Direct Request (CEACR), adopted 2010, 100th 
Session, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO: 
13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_N
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enshrined in Sarayaku could lead to their eventual standardization 
and universal acceptance. While stricter than ILO Convention 169’s 
current consultation requirements, the Sarayaku standard would not 
necessarily impose a greater burden on parties to the convention if 
adopted into a revised version. Therefore, the risk that current parties 
will decline to become signatories to a slightly modified Convention 
is likely minimal.203  
V. CONCLUSION  
Given the strong factual and legal parallels between the Belo 
Monte and Sarayaku disputes, the Sarayaku holding has the potential 
to delegitimize the Belo Monte Dam. Through its acts and omissions 
supporting the project, Brazil has breached the same international 
legal standards that the Inter-American Court held Ecuador had 
violated by authorizing CGC’s presence and unlawful activities on 
Kichwa land. The Inter-American system should therefore apply 
Sarayaku’s new consultation and FPIC standard to denounce Belo 
Monte’s development, formally via court decision or through other 
advisory mechanisms, thereby ordering Brazil to halt construction 
until it complies with the standard’s numerous safeguards. 
 
AME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:2337401,102847,Spain,2010 (expressing the 
CEACR’s); see also Survival International, ILO 169, 
http://assets.survivalinternational.org/static/files/tribes/bulletin_ilo169.pdf (last 
visited July 26, 2013) (implying that ratification commits states to “basic 
consultation requirements” even for the development projects it funds outside of its 
national territory). 
 203. See ILO Convention 169, supra note 5, art. 43 (stipulating that in the event 
of revision, a party state’s ratification of the revised Convention shall involve the 
“immediate denunciation” of the agreement in its preceding form). 
 
